Should Water Be Used as a Weapon? Rethinking Strategic Hydropolitics Between India and Pakistan

The Indus Waters Treaty (IWT) has once again returned to the spotlight after recurring terror attacks and diplomatic stand-offs between India and Pakistan. Several voices within India's strategic and public discourse are calling for a reassessment of this 64-year-old treaty, raising a provocative question: should India use water as a pressure point against Pakistan? As India modernises its national security doctrine and asserts its regional leadership, the debate around hydropolitics has intensified. But should water, the lifeblood of civilization, be used as a geopolitical weapon?

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1. Introduction:

Water has historically served as both a life-giving force and a source of political power. In the 21st century, as geopolitical rivalries intersect with resource insecurity, the question of weaponising water has come to the fore. For India and Pakistan, the issue is particularly potent, given their shared dependence on the Indus River system and their long-standing mistrust. Post incidents like the Pulwama terror attack and ongoing ceasefire violations, voices in Indian media and strategic circles have increasingly advocated for using water as leverage. However, while tempting as a retaliatory tool, this approach demands a deeper examination of its strategic viability, legal legitimacy, ethical grounding, and global consequences.

2. Understanding the Indus Waters Treaty (IWT):

The Indus Waters Treaty, signed in 1960, remains one of the most enduring water-sharing agreements globally. Mediated by the World Bank, the treaty divided the six major rivers of the Indus basin between India and Pakistan:

Eastern Rivers (Ravi, Beas, Sutlej): Allocated entirely to India for unrestricted use.
Western Rivers (Indus, Jhelum, Chenab): Allocated to Pakistan, though India retains non-consumptive rights for hydroelectricity, navigation, and limited irrigation.

The treaty also created a Permanent Indus Commission, tasked with resolving disputes, sharing hydrological data, and facilitating inspections. Despite three wars and numerous military standoffs, the IWT has functioned as a stabilising force in bilateral relations, often referred to as a model of water diplomacy.

Yet, India has long expressed frustration with its underutilisation of treaty entitlements. Several hydroelectric projects in Jammu and Kashmir, such as Kishanganga and Ratle, have faced delays due to bureaucratic hurdles and Pakistani objections, despite being within the treaty’s legal framework.

3. The Logic Behind Weaponising Water:

The argument for strategic use of water against Pakistan arises from multiple motivations:

Strategic leverage in response to terrorism: India’s security establishment has argued that repeated cross-border attacks justify a stronger response. Controlling water flow—particularly in the western rivers—could serve as an unconventional yet impactful deterrent.
Under-utilisation of water rights: According to government data, India does not harness its full share of the 20% allowable use in the western rivers. This has led to a growing narrative that India is losing both resources and geopolitical opportunity.
Political signalling: A shift in water policy could be a diplomatic message to both adversaries and allies—signalling that India is ready to rethink old frameworks when its core interests are repeatedly threatened.
Domestic pressure and public opinion: In the wake of major terror incidents, public sentiment often demands stronger retaliatory actions. Weaponising water, while non-lethal, can be politically appealing.

4. The Risks of Hydrological Retaliation:

While the logic may seem strategically sound in the short term, the long-term repercussions are grave and multifaceted:

Violation of international conventions: The Helsinki Rules, UN Watercourses Convention, and broader principles of international water law discourage using water as a coercive tool.
Potential humanitarian disaster: Disrupting water flow in the Indus basin could affect over 200 million people in Pakistan, particularly its agrarian economy which depends heavily on these rivers.
Environmental consequences: Sudden diversions or stoppages can cause upstream flooding or downstream droughts, impacting ecosystems in both countries.
Regional destabilisation: Any unilateral move may push Pakistan to retaliate, possibly militarily or via proxy actors. This could escalate a water dispute into a broader conflict.
Global diplomatic backlash: India aspires to be seen as a responsible global power. Weaponising water risks alienating international partners, especially when climate-induced water stress is already a global concern.

5. Ethical and Legal Considerations:

India’s foreign policy has traditionally emphasised non-aggression, restraint, and respect for international law. Weaponising water contradicts these principles. Turning a shared natural resource into a punitive tool may achieve tactical gains but at the cost of long-term diplomatic and moral capital.

From a legal standpoint, any move to abrogate or violate the IWT would require significant justification and is likely to trigger international arbitration. Even within the treaty, while India can expedite certain projects, overt disruption could be interpreted as a hostile act, undermining its credibility in other multilateral negotiations—be it climate finance, trade, or border diplomacy.

6. What Global Examples Tell Us:

The world offers lessons on both cooperation and conflict over shared rivers:

Mekong River Basin (Southeast Asia): Despite upstream dams by China, countries like Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam have pushed for basin-wide governance through the Mekong River Commission.
The Danube River (Europe): 19 nations along the Danube maintain joint stewardship, balancing navigation, flood control, and biodiversity.
Nile Basin (Africa): Tensions between Egypt, Ethiopia, and Sudan over the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) show how disputes can escalate without diplomacy, but also how third-party mediation and regional forums can ease tensions.

India’s stature in the Global South and its G20 commitments compel it to be a model in cooperative river governance.

7. The Way Forward for India:

India can assert its rights without breaching international norms or triggering instability:

Treaty modernisation: The IWT, though robust, was signed in a different era. It does not account for climate change, ecological demands, or terrorism-related disruptions. India can diplomatically propose updating clauses to include environmental impact and regional security considerations.
Maximising legal entitlements: Instead of confrontation, India must expedite all permissible projects, using modern technology and environmental safeguards to utilise its share fully and transparently.
Strengthening water diplomacy: Revitalise the Permanent Indus Commission with third-party observers or multilateral forums to add transparency and credibility.
Internal coherence: Build capacity among Indian states (especially J&K, Himachal, Punjab) for better water management, avoiding leakages, disputes, and inefficiencies.
Narrative leadership: India should shape global discourse on "water justice" rather than water warfare—promoting sustainable access, equitable sharing, and hydro-cooperation.

8. Conclusion:

Water is life, but in geopolitics, it can also be a fault line. The temptation to weaponise it in the name of national interest must be weighed against humanitarian, legal, environmental, and reputational costs. India must aim not just for tactical wins, but strategic sustainability. Reforming water-sharing arrangements through dialogue, modernisation, and legal avenues offers a higher road—one that strengthens both our security and our stature.